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Summary 
I estimate how intra-household bargaining affects gay and lesbian couples’ labor 
supplies, investigating their similarity to heterosexual decision-making, in a collective 
household framework. Data from the 2000 US Census show that couples of all types 
exhibit a significant response to bargaining power shifts, as measured by differences 
between partners in age or non-labor income. In gay, lesbian, and heterosexual 
cohabiting couples, a relatively young or rich partner has more bargaining power and 
hence supplies less labor, the opposite holding for his/her mate. Married couples value 
the older spouse instead, or the richer. No effects are found for same-sex roommates. 
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     I.  Introduction 
This paper examines the labor supply choices of gay and lesbian couples, to explore the 
role of intra-household bargaining power in same-sex household decision making. A large body 
of theoretical and empirical literature models and shows that the intra-household distribution of 
power influences heterosexual households’ outcomes (Chiappori, Fortin, Lacroix, 2002, 
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, Lechene, 1994, Browning, Chiappori, 1998, Lundberg and 
Pollak, 1996, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). In particular, the collective household behavior 
model predicts that household members make Pareto-efficient decisions according to their 
respective bargaining power positions, which in turn depend on outside opportunities and social 
and legal factors, such as members’ relative share of non-labor income, their age differences, and 
abortion and divorce laws (Browning et al., 1994, Chiappori et al., 2002, Oreffice, 2007, 
Thomas, 1990).  
However, all this literature is centered on heterosexual families, while nowadays there is 
an important legal and cultural movement toward the legalization of same-sex marriages as 
couples with the same rights and status as heterosexuals, e.g. the California’s Supreme Court 
ruling legalizing same-sex marriages, and the New York governor providing legal status to same-
sex marriages performed elsewhere (May 2008). These recent social changes, along with the 
sizable presence of homosexual partnerships throughout the country, prompt the compelling 
question of whether the household economics developed around heterosexual families directly 
applies to gay and lesbian family behavior, and how similarly to heterosexual couples. 
I analyze same-sex couples’ labor supplies as a household decision, testing their response 
to intra-household bargaining power, and their consistency with the collective household labor 
supply behavior predicted for heterosexual couples. In particular, I focus on how gay and lesbian   2
households’ balance of power and labor supplies are responsive to differences in age and non-
labor income between partners. 
Economic studies of same-sex couples present both similarities and differences with 
heterosexual households. Black, Sanders, Taylor (2007) assume that families’ preferences do not 
systematically differ by sexual orientation. They instead emphasize the differences in biological 
constraints, affecting homosexuals’ fertility, location, household specialization and human 
capital choices. The similarities in family preferences is also found by Jepsen and Jepsen (2002), 
in terms of positive assortative mating for non-labor and labor market traits across all types of 
couples, even though to a smaller extent for same-sex couples. Becker (1991) highlights the 
disparities between homosexual unions and heterosexual marriages due to the lack of difference 
in comparative advantage between partners and to the presence of complementarities, stating that 
same-sex households are less efficient than heterosexual ones. Jepsen and Jepsen (2006) and 
Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) directly link sexual orientation to same-sex partners’ labor supply. 
However, the former study considers labor supply an exogenous variable. The latter analyzes the 
determinants of individual labor supply of same-sex partners, but each partner’s labor supply 
decision is assumed to depend only on his/her own characteristics, completely disregarding the 
influence of the other partner, and the household dimension of labor supply decisions. Finally, 
there is evidence in the literature of persistent wage disparities among gay, lesbian and 
heterosexual workers, with lesbians earning significantly more than heterosexual women, and 
gay men earning significantly less than heterosexual men (e.g. Allegretto and Arthur, 2001, 
Black, Makar, Sanders, Taylor, 2003, Blandford, 2003, Jepsen, 2007). 
However, none of these studies examines the labor supply choices of same-sex couples as 
a household endogenous decision. I test whether same-sex couples make efficient labor supply   3
choices influenced by partners’ bargaining power, as it is found to be the case for heterosexual 
households, and investigate possible differences in these effects across lesbian, gay, heterosexual 
cohabiting and married couples. Pairs of same-sex male and female roommates are used as 
comparison group. Black et al. (2007) and Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) suggest that family 
preferences do not depend on sexual orientation, I want to check whether the intra-household 
decision process and bargaining power as well do not vary with sexual orientation.  
I focus on the differences in age and non-labor income ownership between partners, as 
indicators of intra-household bargaining power. The distribution of these traits within a couple, 
which captures each partner’s outside opportunities, is considered to affect the household 
members’ bargaining position and to have a significant impact on household choices, such as 
labor supply, clothing expenditure and children’s health (Browning et al., 1994, Schultz, 1990, 
Thomas, 1990, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). Psychologists as well report that the partner with 
greater financial resources has greater power, also in same-sex couples (Caldwell and Peplau, 
1984, Patterson, 2000). When a partner has a relatively better trait (relatively richer or 
younger/older), the distribution of gains from the relationship would shift in his/her favor, 
generating opposite income effects on the partners. Consequently, the partner with a more 
favorable bargaining position would decrease his/her labor supply, while his/her mate would 
increase his/hers (Browning et al. 1994, Chiappori et al., 2002).  I also test restrictions on these 
partners’ labor supply responses,, which are predicted by the collective household labor supply 
model, and compute the sharing rule partners use to divide their household non-labor resources, 
highlighting the role of the age and non-labor income differences in determining the income 
transfers within households. This evidence would strengthen the consistency and interpretation 
of my findings, since it is very unlikely to hold unless the bargaining power explanation and the   4
collective household approach are correct for same-sex couples as well, rejecting the unitary 
model prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intra-household decisions. 
  I use Census data for the year 2000, the five-percent sample of the Public Use Microdata 
Set (PUMS), which provides the most recent largest sample of gay and lesbian partners and their 
detailed demographic, labor and income information, along with standard samples of 
heterosexual individuals. These data allow to identify only members of same-sex couples but not 
single gays or lesbians. This limitation represents a lesser concern here, because my analysis 
applies to couples. My identification strategy consists of estimating the effects of intra-household 
age and non-labor income differences on both partners’ labor supplies, and comparing changes in 
their labor supplies cross-sectionally among gay, lesbian, heterosexual couples and roommates. 
My empirical analysis reveals that a relatively lower age (higher non-labor income) 
significantly reduces the younger (richer) partner’s labor supply, while it significantly increases 
the labor supply of his/her relatively poorer (older) mate, controlling for both partners’ wages, 
education and other individual and household characteristics. Results are similar for gay, lesbian 
and heterosexual cohabiting couples alike, while married (heterosexual) couples display more 
bargaining power for the older spouse, and somewhat smaller labor supply effects. Consistently 
with the intra-household bargaining interpretation, same-sex pairs of roommates do not show any 
significant impact. In particular, in same-sex couples I find that being 5 years younger than your 
lesbian partner reduces your labor supply by around 23 annual hours, while it increases your 
mate’s labor supply by about 35 annual hours, the figures being 23 and 37, respectively, for gay 
couples. Owning five thousand dollars more non-labor income than your lesbian partner reduces 
your labor supply by around 19 annual hours, while it increases your mate’s labor supply by 
about 47 annual hours (32 and 41 for gay partners).    5
These findings represent the first empirical support for gay and lesbian households’ labor 
supplies to be affected by bargaining power forces, according to the household behavior 
framework predicted for heterosexual households.  
  Alternative explanations such as the role of age and non-labor income on individual 
preferences for leisure, age and income differences as proxies for local labor market conditions 
and attitudes toward gays and lesbians, household labor specialization, and the misreporting of 
unmarried homosexual partners in the 2000 Census sample are considered. I argue that these 
phenomena cannot consistently explain my results, given my intra-household bargaining 
predictions and empirical evidence. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework. Section 
3 describes the empirical specification and data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 
5 considers alternative explanations for the findings. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
I apply the collective household labor supply model with distribution factors, developed 
by Chiappori et. al. (2002), to same-sex couples
1. A household is composed of two decision 
makers, head and partner, each having a distinct utility function on consumption and leisure. 
Households are assumed to make Pareto-efficient decisions about each member’s leisure and 
consumption. Preferences are egoistic, in that one mate’s utility does not depend on the other’s 
consumption or leisure, although the model can be extended to allow for caring preferences and 
also public goods. Let h
i and C
i for i = h, p denote member i’s labor supply and consumption of 
a private composite good (whose price is normalized to unity). The utility function of member i 
                                                 
1 I also consider heterosexual couples in my empirical analysis.   6
is  ) , , 1 ( z C h U
i i i − , where U is strictly quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable 
for i = h, p, and z represents preference parameters, such as education of the two mates. Let y 
denote household non-labor income and wi the wage rate of mate i. Finally, let s1 and s2 denote 
two  distribution factors, variables that affect the intra-household decision process, but not 
individual preferences or the joint consumption set. The two bargaining power factors considered 
in this analysis are the differences between mates in non-labor income and age. For simplicity, I 
abstract from the non-pecuniary benefits of companionship. I follow convention and assume that 
the utility from companionship is additive; in particular, it does not influence the trade-off 
between leisure and consumption. 
The optimal allocations of labor supply of each mate are determined by the following 
program:  
) , , 1 ( max
, z C h U
h h h
C h




h h w z s s y w w C + ≤ ) , , , , , ( 2 1 ϕ    
The partner faces a symmetric problem,  ) , , , , , ( 2 1 z s s y w w p h ϕ representing the head’s share of 
non-labor income  y, and the partner receiving y - ) , , , , , ( 2 1 z s s y w w p h ϕ . This sharing 
rule ) , , , , , ( 2 1 z s s y w w p h ϕ with which mates divide their non-labor household resources is Pareto-
optimally chosen by the couple and depends on the balance of bargaining power. In particular, 
the stronger the head’s bargaining power, the higher his/her share of non-labor income and the 
lower his/her partner’s. The sharing rule ) , , , , , ( 2 1 z s s y w w p h ϕ is a function of prices (here 
normalized to unity), mates’ wages, household non-labor income, distribution factors (here the   7
non-labor income gap and age gap)
2, and other observable characteristics z (preference 
parameters).  
Solving these maximization problems yields the following equilibrium labor supply 
functions of the two mates:  
] ), , , , , , ( , [ 2 1 z z s s y w w w h h p h h
h h ϕ =               
] ), , , , , , ( , [ 2 1 z z s s y w w y w h h p h p
p p ϕ − = .              
The derivatives of each labor supply function with respect to the second arguments are 
unambiguously negative, reflecting a pure income effect. Hence, factors that strengthen the 
head’s bargaining power reduce the labor supplied by the head and increase the labor supplied by 
the partner, ceteris paribus, in particular controlling for own wage and the couples’ total non-
labor income y. I investigate whether same-sex couples respond to such factors in the direction 
predicted by the theory, by testing their impact on these couples’ labor supplies, and comparing 
it to the corresponding effects on heterosexual cohabiting and married couples. Pairs of same-sex 
roommates are also considered, as control group. Roommates share the mere cohabiting aspects 
of couples, but do not constitute a household or couple, so that their relationship does not involve 
intra-household bargaining and household decision making. Therefore, their labor supplies 
should not be affected by the bargaining power shifts illustrated above, and the collective 
household model predictions should not hold in their case. 
                                                 
2 The sex ratio, divorce laws, abortion legalization, alimony, and child benefits laws, are other 
examples of distribution factors that have been studied in the literature on heterosexual 
households (Chiappori et al, 2002, Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, Oreffice, 2007).   8
  This theoretical framework imposes further restrictions on the partners’ labor supplies 
and on the parameters of the sharing rule, which I test in my empirical analysis. First, the labor 























              
Second, the sharing rule can be recovered up to an additive function k(z) and the partial 
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All these predictions are very unlikely to be fulfilled unless my bargaining power explanation 
and the collective household approach are correct and applicable to same-sex couples as well. 
They would show that distribution factors have sizable effects on same-sex households’ 
decisions, and would reject the unitary model prediction that bargaining power forces are 
irrelevant to intra-household decisions. In particular, a significant impact of the non-labor 
income difference on partners’ labor supplies represents a rejection of the income pooling 
hypothesis, which has been empirically rejected for heterosexual households (Browning et al., 
1994, Schultz, 1990, Thomas, 1990). 
 
                                                 
3 Propositions 1 and 3 in Chiappori et al. (2002). 




y h h , 
where
i
j h is the partial derivative of hours worked of member i with respect to the variable j.   9
III. Empirical Specification and Data 
III.I Identification Strategy 
My main sample consists of gay and lesbian couples with both partners between 18 and 
65 years of age. I also consider heterosexual cohabiting and married men and women, and 
roommates, all in the same age bracket. Moreover, all individuals in my samples are not in 
school, not in the military, and not in a farm household. A couple consists of the head of the 
household and his/her unmarried partner, spouse or roommate. I include intact couples only if 
both the head and the mate are actually present, while I exclude households where there are 
multiple mates, or more than two adults.  
The following equations for labor supply are estimated for heads and partners, and run on 
each type of couples, gay, lesbian, male roommates, female roommates, heterosexual cohabiting, 
and married couples: 
  
h p h h X diff age diff y y w w h ε δ γ γ α α α + + + + + + = _ _ ln ln 2 1 3 2 1  
p p h p X diff age diff y y w w h ε ψ λ λ β β β + + + + + + = _ _ ln ln 2 1 3 2 1  
y_diff and age_diff are the two bargaining power factors under consideration. The former is 
defined as the head’s total non-labor income in dollars minus the partner’s total non-labor 
income in dollars, while the latter as the head’s age in years minus the partner’s age in years (for 
heterosexual couples, it is the male mate/spouse’s trait minus the female mate/spouse’s trait
5). 
                                                 
5 Heterosexual mates are distinguished according to their gender. As customary in studies of 
heterosexual households, the emphasis is on the role and behavior of male members versus 
female members, rather than on the Census definition of head and unmarried partner/spouse, 
where the head is the individual who owns the housing unit or signs the rental contract, and the 
partner/spouse is the individual who identifies himself/herself as such.    10
Both the individual non-labor income and age variables do not have any missing values and their 
differences can be either positive or negative, or zero
6.       
My identification strategy of these bargaining power effects consists of 
estimating 1 γ and 2 γ for heads, and 1 λ and 2 λ for partners. The impact of the non-labor income (age) 
difference on the labor supply of heads and partners is captured by 1 γ and 1 λ ( 2 γ and 2 λ ) 
respectively. According to the theory, if a partner is relatively richer, or being relatively young is 
a favorable trait, then his/her labor supply should decline and the labor supply of his/her mate 
should increase. Hence, 1 γ and 2 λ should be negative, while 2 γ and 1 λ should be positive. 
The other regressors are the wage rate 
i w of each mate i = h, p, the couple’s total non-labor 
income y
7, and a vector of covariates X. X includes education of each partner, number of each 
partner’s own children living in the household, and only own age of mate i, so that the effect of 
                                                 
6 The ratio of non-labor incomes and the ratio of ages were used as alternative distribution 
factors. However, the former is not defined for the several couples with no non-labor income, 
and they both introduce non-linearities in the labor supply equations. Even though the ratios 
yield the same pattern of bargaining power effects, the differences of non-labor incomes and 
ages are preferred in this analysis (as in Browning et al., 1994). The difference (ratio) in 
educational attainment across partners was also explored, but it did not exhibit any impact on 
household labor supplies, as in Browning et al. (1994). 
7 All wage and income variables refer to the previous year (1999). I discard individuals who are 
self-employed, so that wages only reflect income from wages and salaries, and non-labor income 
is constructed as the individual’s total income minus earned income, where earned income 
coincides with wage income for non-self employed.     11
age_diff can be identified. A dummy variable for being black rather than white is also included 
at the household level, since I drop the few interracial unions present in my samples, and my 
main specifications focus on black or white couples
8. X also includes state fixed effects, which 
should capture the different labor market opportunities and social and legal attitudes toward gays 
and lesbians that exist across states. Alternatively, I include the state unemployment rate, the 
state total labor force participation and female labor force participation, to control for the level of 
economic activity in a state and especially for employment opportunities, and dummy variables 
for the presence in a state of legal provisions for homosexual couples, such as domestic 
partnerships and civil unions.  
The dependent variable in my labor supply regressions is total annual hours worked in the 
previous year. Households in which either the head or the partner does not work are also 
included in my samples and I account for a possible selection bias toward working individuals by 
correcting for sample selection with Heckman MLE
9. As a source of identification, I use 
distributional assumptions on the first step residuals alone or exclusion restrictions
10. Both 
procedures yield similar robust results. I use predicted wages to measure the non-working mates’ 
wages and to address the possible endogeneity of individuals’ observed wages. To predict 
individuals’ wages, I take a standard human capital approach, also implemented in the collective 
labor supply literature (e.g., Donni, 2007), and consider a wage equation in which wage depends 
                                                 
8 Including other races such as Asians does not alter my bargaining power estimates. 
9 I only exclude household observations where neither the head nor the partner work, given that 
this analysis measures bargaining power changes through labor supply.  
10 The latter is young children only affecting the participation decision but not labor supply. 
Tables report estimation with identification from statistical distribution assumptions.   12
on the individual’s age, race, education, education squared, and cubed, but does not depend on 
his/her partner’s characteristics. This equation is then estimated separately for participating gays, 
lesbians, heterosexual male cohabitants, heterosexual female cohabitants, husbands, wives, male 
and female roommates, in my samples, with a correction for selection bias
11. The generated fitted 
values then replace the wage observations of the corresponding individuals in my samples
12. 
Finally, Wald tests of overall statistical significance performed on the above labor supply 
regressions do not reject the validity of the framework I use. 
The labor supply regressions are run using robust standard errors clustered by state, 
which allow for correlation of household observations within state. I alternatively clustered by 
metropolitan area, even though a metropolitan area has not been assigned to almost a third of the 
observations
13. My specifications do not use a differences-in-differences estimator: heads’ and 
partners’ regressions are estimated separately, across types of couples. As such, they should not 
suffer from the understated standard errors highlighted by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2004). At any rate, clustering by state (metropolitan area) should rectify such an 
underestimation, if it is present.   
 
                                                 
11 The participation decision depends on the number of children, dummies for age brackets, 
education, race and measures of local economy. 
12 Tables report estimation with the predicted partner/spouse’s and own wages.  
13 The Census reports that many metropolitan areas have only been partially identified in 2000, 
and that “users should not assume that the identified portion of a partly-identified metropolitan 
area is a representative sample of the entire metropolitan area”. Thus my main specifications are 
clustered by state.   13
III.II Additional Tests 
The collective labor supply framework provides additional testable restrictions on the 
impact of the non-labor income and age differences on mates’ labor supplies, and on how the 
sharing rule varies with the distribution factors, non-labor income, and wages of each mate, as 
illustrated in Section II. Specifically, I test the following interaction among the coefficients of the 
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where 3 1 3 1 β γ α λ − = Δ  and s1 and s2 are the non-labor income difference and age difference, 
respectively. Solving the above system of differential equations yields the following sharing rule 
equation:  
) ( ) _ _ ln ln (
1
1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 z k diff age diff y y w w p h + + + + +
Δ
= λ γ λ γ λ α λ α γ β ϕ  
identifiable up to an additive term k(z), since z affects both the sharing rule and the preferences 
(Chiappori et al, 2002). All these conditions are tested and recovered through my estimation of 
the coefficients of the partners’ labor supply equations.  
 
III.III Data 
Estimation is carried out on Census data for the year 2000, specifically the five-percent 
sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS), which provides the most recent largest sample   14
of gay and lesbian partners and their detailed demographic, labor and income information, along 
with standard samples of heterosexual individuals. Unmarried “heads” and “unmarried partners”, 
“heads” and “roommates”, and a random sample (10 percent) of married “heads” and “spouses” 
were extracted from the Census. Records in these files were then matched on the household 
identification code “serial” to create a single observation for each couple. All individuals with 
imputed values for sex, marital status, and relationship to the head of the household were 
excluded from my samples (subsection V.IV explains the relevance of this procedure). Couples 
with the head and the partner sharing the same gender were then identified as same-sex couples, 
gay and lesbian. In the Census, gays and lesbians are identified by their cohabiting relationship, a 
household being recorded as a same-sex union if the “relationship to head” is specified as 
“unmarried partner”, so that single gays or lesbians can not be recovered. This limitation 
represents a lesser concern here, because my analysis applies to couples. However, most 
economic studies on homosexuals use Census data, of 1990 or 2000. Others (e.g. Black et al., 
2003, Blandford, 2003) use the General Social Survey (GSS) data, where single gays and 
lesbians can be identified, but the sample size is much smaller than in the Census data, and 
sexual orientation is inferred from self-reported sexual activity. 
Individual weights are used to make the sample representative of the US population and 
economy. The state unemployment rate, state total labor force participation and female labor 
force participation are retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the heads’ and partners’ main variables, by 
type of couple. In the same-sex samples, gays and lesbians on average work similar annual 
hours, earn a similar hourly wage, and their education and age are also comparable. However, 
within both gays and lesbian couples, heads work more hours than their partners, earn a higher   15
wage, and are slightly more educated and older. On average, the age difference is about .83 for 
lesbians and 1.57 years for gays, and the non-labor income difference is around $ 1,765 for gays 
and $ 880 for lesbians. Heterosexual couples exhibit a higher annual labor supply and wage for 
male than female mates, with the stronger disparity within married couples, while their 
educational attainment is lower than same-sex couples (lowest for heterosexual cohabiting). 
Husbands (male mates) are on average 2.14 (1.71) years older than their wives (female mates), 
and their average non-labor income difference amounts to $ 2,898 (35.16). Pairs of roommates 
exhibit very similar labor supply and wage patterns between mates, who also share the same 
education level. Their average age and income differences are 1.24 and $ 892 in female pairs, 
and 1.28 and $ 1043 for male roommates.  
 
IV. Results 
IV.I Main Evidence 
The main results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The estimated effects of the non-labor 
income difference and age difference are significant for both heads and partners, and their signs 
go in the direction predicted by the theory. The point estimates indicate that in lesbian couples 
(columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) being 5 years younger reduces the younger heads’ annual labor 
supply by about 23 hours (P value = .045), while their partners’ is increased by 35 hours (P value 
= .072). As to the other bargaining power variable, owning five thousand dollars more non-labor 
income implies a decline in heads’ labor supply of 19 hours (P value = .043), and an increase in 
their partners’ of 47 hours per year (P value = .002). Gay couples exhibit a similar impact 
(columns 3 and 4 of Table 2). Their estimated coefficients correspond to -23 and 37 heads’ and 
partners’ hours worked for a five year younger head (P values .088 and .02), while the impact of   16
a five thousand dollar income gap amounts to -32 and 41 annual hours worked by heads and 
partners, respectively (P values .004 and .031). The evidence clearly shows that all same-sex 
couples exhibit statistically significant responses to bargaining power forces. The younger 
(richer) partner holds a more favorable bargaining position and lowers his/her labor supply, 
while his/her mate increases his/her labor supply. Moreover, these labor supply responses are not 
statistically different between gay and lesbian couples. As reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
2,  the heterosexual cohabiting sample exhibits a similar pattern of effects to homosexual 
households. Married couples differ from all types of cohabiting households in that they attribute 
more bargaining power to the older spouse, and the magnitude of the effects of the income and 
age differences is smaller, especially for females (columns 11 and 12 of Table 2). Specifically, 
heterosexual cohabiting couples’ labor supply effects of a five year age difference are -18 and 20 
hours, while a $ 5,000 income difference generates an estimated hour change of -21 and 27 hours 
for male and female mates, respectively. For husbands and wives, the corresponding age and 
income effects amount to 15 and -7 hours, and -17 and 14 hours.  
These estimated bargaining power forces and labor supply responses are sizable, 
corresponding to several days of work a year. The concurrent impact on both partners, and with 
opposite outcomes, is remarkable given the acknowledged rigidities in the labor supplies, and the 
frequency of the reported labor supply peaking around 40 hours of work per week. Traditional 
analyses do not emphasize changes by both spouses, let alone their labor supply responding to 
bargaining power forces. Moreover, no study finds that same-sex households’ labor supply 
decisions reflect the collective household behavior of heterosexual couples and are influenced by 
bargaining factors such as non-labor income ownership and age. The intra-household decision 
process does not appear to vary by sexual orientation. These findings also show that income   17
pooling does not hold for either heterosexual or same-sex couples. So far, the income pooling 
hypothesis and the unitary model prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intra-
household decisions had been empirically rejected only for heterosexual households (Browning 
et al., 1994, Schultz, 1990, Thomas, 1990). 
As to the age gap, in both same-sex and opposite-sex cohabiting couples, the younger 
mate exhibits more bargaining power, while married couples are found to value being relatively 
old, controlling for wages and education of each partner and individual age. This evidence on 
married households corresponds to what is found in the literature, where the spouses’ age 
difference is considered a traditional measure of bargaining power, and the older spouse, not the 
younger, has a favorable position (e.g. Browning et al., 1994, Lyons, Neelakantan, Fava, 2008). 
These studies focus on household expenditures and financial decisions of married couples, and 
do not control for wages, hours worked, or actual earnings, so that being older also captures 
higher earning capacity and labor market opportunities, which are associated to more bargaining 
power. However, I show that once individual labor market characteristics are disentangled from 
age and specifically controlled for, married couples still value being relatively old, while relative 
youth enhances bargaining power in all cohabiting relationships, across sexual orientations.  
These results also match the evidence from psychological studies on family relationships. 
Patterson (2000) reports that the partner with greater financial resources tends to have more 
power within the couple, in both homosexual and heterosexual unions. Moreover, no difference 
in break-up rates is found between lesbian and gay couples, with only married couples exhibiting 
a lower dissolution rate (Caldwell and Peplau, 1984, Kurdek, 1998, Patterson, 2000). The more 
stable and durable relationship of married couples may make spouses less responsive to outside 
opportunities and bargaining power. This would explain why in all cohabiting relationship I find   18
that the younger partner has more bargaining power, since cohabitants have lower barriers to 
leave and younger individuals have better outside options. The signal conveyed by relative youth 
about the quality of outside opportunities may be more relevant for cohabiting rather than 
married couples, and represent a more credible threat, because the former are aware that their 
household is less stable, lacking the commitment of legal marriage (Kurdek, 1998). In married 
couples, the life experience, knowledge and maturity of the older spouse play an important role 
of guidance in the stability of the relationship and are valued by the younger spouse (Fava et al., 
2008). Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) as well find that same-sex couples are more similar to 
cohabiting than to married opposite-sex couples. Finally, wives’ smaller bargaining power 
effects may be also due to stronger rigidities in their labor supply schedules. The more common 
presence of children within marriage than in cohabiting couples, and especially than in same-sex 
couples
14, may make spouses, and wives in particular, less likely to respond to bargaining power 
in terms of labor supply shifts.    
As to the other covariates in the labor supply equations, most parameter estimates for all 
couples are comparable to the literature. In particular, the mates’ own wage response is always 
positive significant, as is the cross-wage effects between mates’ labor supplies (Table 3). The 
couple’s total non-labor income and own age have a negative effect on labor supply, while 
education has a positive impact, although the coefficients are not always precisely estimated. 
Being black is associated with fewer hours of work, as own household children, except for 
heterosexual male mates for whom children have a positive effect on labor supply. This is mostly 
in line with the findings in the family labor supply literature. For instance, Chiappori et al. 
                                                 
14 In my samples, the average number of household children is 1.29 in married couples, .90 in 
heterosexual cohabiting couples, and .40 and .23 in lesbian and gay couples.    19
(2002) run similar spouses’ labor supply equations and show positive significant cross wage 
effects,  negative own age estimates and positive significant own wage effects for wives.  
The bargaining power effect is also estimated on pairs of male and female roommates. 
The results are detailed in columns 7 to 10 of Table 2. Their labor supply regressions show no 
significant impact of either the income or age differences, as theory predicts. This lack of impact 
on roommates strengthens my bargaining power interpretation of the labor supply responses of 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples’. Finally, the disparity between same-sex couples’ and 
roommates’ behavior confirms that the sample of same-sex couples is indeed formed by 
homosexual partners rather than by roommates who wrongly identify themselves as “unmarried 
partners”. 
These findings represent the first empirical support for the labor supplies of gay and 
lesbian households to be affected by bargaining power forces, and emphasize that same-sex 
household decision making reflect heterosexual households’ behavior, more closely to 
cohabiting than married couples. Bargaining power is found to be positively related to non-labor 
income ownership in all types of couples, whereas relative youth increases bargaining power in 
all cohabiting couples but decreases it in married couples.  
Further evidence presented below, together with the discussion of various alternative 
explanations, should help making my results convincing and contribute to the understanding of 
the economic behavior of gay and lesbian families.  
 
IV.II Additional Findings 
  I test the restrictions on the proportionality of the partners’ labor supply responses to the 
non-labor income and age differences, and I recover the estimated effects of non-labor income,   20
mates’ wages and the two bargaining power factors on the sharing rule, as illustrated in sections 
II and III.II. 





y h h  holds in my samples), the ratios of the coefficients on y_diff and age_diff are not 
statistically different across mates, and this proportionality holds for all types of couples, as 
shown in Table 4.  Table 5 reports the estimated parameters of the sharing rule. In lesbian 
couples, a five years age gap (a $ 5,000 non-labor income gap) will induce the older (poorer) 
partner to transfer an additional $ 1915 ($ 1560) of the couple’s non-labor income to the younger 
(richer) partner. In gay couples, these figures correspond to transfer an additional $ 1515 ($ 
2100) of income to the younger (richer) partner. In heterosexual cohabiting couples, a more 
favorable bargaining position increases the younger (richer) partner’s share of income by $ 1360 
($ 1600), while in married couples being 5 years older ($ 5,000 richer) corresponds to an 
increase in $ 865 (980) of the older (richer) spouse’s share. These findings suggest that 
bargaining power forces do affect the intra-household allocation of resources, of same-sex 
couples as well. Table 5 also shows that earning higher wages translates into the transfer of more 
non-labor income to the higher earner, and that a $ 1.00 increase in the couple’s total non-labor 
income increases the head’s share of household non-labor income by 70 cents for lesbians, 34 
cents for gay couples, 54 cents for cohabiting and 38 cents for married couples. 
Distribution factors have sizable effects on same-sex households’ decisions. The unitary 
model prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intra-household decisions, and 
the income pooling hypothesis, are rejected for all households alike, homosexual or heterosexual, 
cohabiting or married.  
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V. Alternative Explanations 
The predicted opposite labor supply effects on both mates, the lack of any impact on 
roommates, and the proportionality restrictions are very unlikely to hold unless my bargaining 
power explanation and the collective household approach are correct and applicable to same-sex 
couples. Furthermore, I argue that the following phenomena cannot consistently explain my 
results, given my intra-household bargaining predictions and empirical evidence. 
 
V.I Bargaining power variables as proxies for local labor market conditions and attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians 
It may be possible that the labor supply of the younger or richer homosexual partner falls 
not as a result of the bargaining power effect, but due to poor local economic opportunities 
and/or unfriendly attitudes toward gays or lesbians. Similarly, it could be that younger and richer 
heterosexual women work less, and their male partners work more, because they face worse job 
opportunities than men. There are at least three reasons to believe that the local economy and 
attitude hypothesis does not provide a plausible alternative explanation for my findings. First, my 
labor supply regressions include individuals’ wages and education, own age, and state fixed 
effects (alternatively, state unemployment rate, total and female labor force participation rate, 
and dummy variables for state legal provisions for homosexual couples) which account for the 
variation in labor market opportunities and attitudes. My findings are also robust to adding 
individual controls for occupation categories in my labor supply regressions. Second, the 
predicted labor supply changes have a distinctive opposite impact on the members of each type 
of couple. It is difficult to understand why the labor supply of a gay or lesbian individual should 
be lower while his/her partner is higher, when they share the same gender and sexual orientation,   22
and thus the same labor market conditions and potential earnings discrimination. Third, gay and 
lesbian workers exhibit an opposite earnings differential with respect to their heterosexual 
counterparts, lesbians earning significantly more than heterosexual women, and gay men earning 
significantly less than heterosexual men (Allegretto and Arthur, 2001, Black et al., 2003, Jepsen, 
2007). If it were a gender effect, labor market conditions would not explain my findings of a 
same pattern of results for gays, lesbians and heterosexuals alike. Finally, pairs of male and 
female roommates do not exhibit any labor supply effect of age and income differences, while 
sharing the same gender and labor market characteristics as homosexual couples. As to 
heterosexual couples, it is hard to reconcile with labor market disparities the opposite effect of 
relative age on cohabiting and married individuals, when they share the same gender, sexual 
orientation and similar age, wage and education profiles. 
 
V.II Age, non-labor income and labor supply 
  Controlling for own age and wage, the age difference between mates should not capture 
an individual’s marginal utility of leisure and affect his/her labor supply through this channel. 
However, younger cohabitants do not work less than older or married workers, as instead my 
bargaining power effects show. Matching preferences either do not provide a plausible 
alternative explanation for my findings. Older individuals may prefer to have a partnership with 
younger persons, but this youth value does not translate into a lower preference for leisure. 
Matching with younger individuals does not necessarily affect the marginal utility from leisure 
making the older partner work more. Actually, the opposite may be more likely, the younger 
your companion is, the more you value leisure and the less you work. On the other hand, if an   23
older partner needs to work more hours to earn more income to “buy” a relationship with a 
younger partner, then this exactly illustrates the bargaining power effect at stake in this study
15. 
The same reasoning holds for non-labor income differences. In particular, if non-labor 
income is endogenous to labor supply choices, then it is likely that high non-labor income 
suggests high labor supply. If an individual’s disutility from work is low, he/she works many 
hours and as a result owns a high non-labor income. However, this endogeneity bias can not 
explain my findings since it would predict more hours of work with higher income, whereas my 
bargaining power effects predict that higher non-labor income differences lead to lower labor 
supply, and roommates do not exhibit any labor supply impact. Finally, non-labor income has 
been treated as an exogenous measure of bargaining power by the literature (Browning et al, 
1994 and Thomas, 1990). 
 
V.III Household specialization 
Bargaining power variables such as income and age difference may somewhat capture 
differential productivity in household production. However, controlling for own age, and 
education and wages of both mates, should ensure that comparative advantage and household 
productivity is disentangled from my bargaining power measures. Besides, there is no specific 
economic reason why the younger partner should specialize in household production and work 
less, while the older partner works more in the labor market, married couples exhibiting the 
opposite pattern. A similar argument holds for non-labor income ownership. Being relatively 
richer does not imply being more productive at home and working less in the labor market. Also, 
                                                 
15 The same, reversed, argument holds for married couples, for whom being relatively old is the 
favorable trait.   24
this specialization pattern would not necessarily be present in all types of couples, gay, lesbian 
and heterosexual alike. Finally, the literature emphasizes the specialization effect mainly for 
married heterosexual couples, while most of my samples consist of unmarried couples, including 
homosexuals. 
 
V.IV Misreporting of same-sex partners in the Census data 
The Census identifies same-sex partners by their cohabiting relationship with an 
individual of the same gender who records his/her “relationship to the head of the household” as 
“unmarried partner”. Unfortunately, the 2000 Census modified the relationship to head from 
“spouse” to “unmarried partner” and/or the marital status from married to unmarried, for couples 
with both mates of the same sex, without signaling the allocated values in the flag variable of 
relationship to head. As documented in Black et al. (2006), this procedure lead to consider 
several heterosexual married couples as same-sex couples who wrongly reported their sex or 
relationship to head. To avoid this misclassification, all individuals with imputed values for 
marital status, sex, and relationship to head were excluded from my samples, using the 
corresponding “q” variables which flag allocated values, as suggested by Black et al. (2006) and 
Jepsen and Jepsen (2002). Overall, more than forty percent of same-sex couples are dropped 
because of these imputed values, whereas only very few heterosexual couples are affected (four 
percent of cohabitants and less than one percent of married couples). This process ensures that 
the same-sex couples at stake are real homosexual partnerships, rather than heterosexuals 
misreporting their gender or relationship to head, although homosexuals who wrongly identify 
themselves as married are also dropped (by year 2000, no US state had legalized same-sex   25
marriages)
 16. The concern that sentimentally un-related individuals voluntarily identify 
themselves as unmarried partners (rather than roommates) is minimal, given the stigma attached 
to homosexuality. However, both of these last two instances of mis-reporting would work against 
my findings of same-sex couples behaving as heterosexual families. Finally, sexual orientation is 
inferred from self-reported data and under-reporting of homosexual status (identifying as 
“unmarried partner”) may be correlated with demographic characteristics such as education and 
income. At any rate, there is no reason why mis-reporting is more severe in the Census than in 




This is the first study of same-sex couples’ labor supplies as an endogenous household 
choice, and the first empirical support for gay and lesbian households’ labor supplies to be 
affected by bargaining power forces, in the direction predicted by the theory for heterosexual 
households. In particular, I show that gay and lesbian couples do behave as heterosexual couples, 
their labor supplies being responsive to differences in age and non-labor income between 
partners. At the same time, no effect is found on same-sex pairs of roommates, consistently with 
the household bargaining interpretation.  
Using 2000 US Census data, I find that each gay and lesbian partner’s labor supply is 
negatively related to their level of bargaining power. Specifically, a relatively lower age (higher 
non-labor income) significantly reduces the younger (richer) partner’s labor supply, while it 
                                                 
16 Including the observations with Census-allocated marital status yields very similar patterns of 
bargaining power effects, at higher significance levels. 
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significantly increases the labor supply of his/her relatively older (poorer) mate, controlling for 
both partners’ wages, education and other individual and household characteristics. Results are 
similar for gay, lesbian and heterosexual cohabiting couples alike. Married couples attribute a 
more favorable position to the older spouse, or the richer, with significant but somewhat smaller 
bargaining power effects. Additionally, I cannot statistically reject the proportionality constraints 
on the partners’ labor supply responses to the two bargaining power factors, as predicted by the 
collective household labor supply model. Finally, the sharing rule with which partners divide 
their household non-labor resources is recovered, highlighting that a favorable age difference 
and/or non-labor income difference increases a mate’s allocated income share, in all types of 
couples.    27
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
              Heads                Partners              Heads                 Partners              Male Mates                Female Mates
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Age_diff 0.83 6.72 0.83 6.72 1.57 7.92 1.57 7.92 1.71 6.6 1.71 6.6
Y_diff 880.4 11380 880.4 11380 1765 19971 1765 19971 35.16 12695 35.16 12695
Hours worked* 2069 537.06 1990.1 567.66 2185 615.72 2065.1 615.88 1958.6 837.64 1663 855.75
Log of wage* 3.02 0.35 2.35 0.68 3.09 0.31 2.37 0.64 2.87 0.28 2.01 0.64
Age 38.42 9.03 37.6 8.98 41.17 8.88 38.66 9.19 39.22 9.45 37.51 9.03
Education 14.4 2.33 14.12 2.36 14.63 2.19 14.22 2.27 12.73 2.2 12.93 2.12
Couple's non-labor income Y 3799 12340 3799 12340 6809 21461 6809 21461 4072 13628 4072 13628
Number of children 0.36 0.78 0.056 0.28 0.12 0.51 0.11 0.14 0.351 0.825 0.54 0.959
Dummy for black 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.36
Number of observations 2950 2950 2588 2588 68762 68762
              Heads                Partners              Heads                 Partners              Husbands
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev
Age_diff 1.24 7.24 1.24 7.24 1.28 7.24 1.28 7.24 2.14 4.46 2.14 4.46
Y_diff 891.9 12418 891.88 12418 1044 12249 1044 12249 2898 17062 2898 17062
Hours worked* 1989 636.04 1936 649.81 2081 671.75 2023 675.4 2108 788 1318 951
Log of wage* 2.81 0.26 2.72 0.25 2.85 0.29 2.76 0.24 3.18 0.36 1.96 0.88
Age 35.54 11.79 34.3 11.57 32.96 10.48 31.68 9.65 44.09 10.48 41.95 10.2
Education 14.24 2.33 14.04 2.32 13.68 2.31 13.43 2.3 13.43 2.48 13.35 2.28
Couple's non-labor income Y 4482 15284 4482 15284 3524 13907 3524 13907 5926 19699 5926 19699
Number of children 0.213 0.62 0.025 0.2 0.036 0.245 0.003 0.06 1.29 1.2 1.29 1.2
Dummy for black 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
Number of observations 8480 8480 9657 9657 96650 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
In heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait. 
*For women and men with positive hours of work.  
Wives
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Table 2. Labor Supply Effects of Age and Non-Labor Income differences on Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples
Lesbian Couples Gay Couples
Heads Partners Heads Partners Male Mates Female Mates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age_diff 4.61 ** -6.97 *** 4.67 *** -7.48 ** 3.57 *** -3.94***
(2.30) (3.88) (2.74) (3.21) (.52) (.454)
Y_diff -.0037 ** .0095 * -.0065 * .0081 ** -.0042 *** .0053***
(.0018) (.0031) (.0022) (.0038) (.0006) (.0007)
Number  of observations 2950 2950 2588 2588 68762 68762
Heads Partners Heads Partners Husbands Wives
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age_diff 3.44 -0.875 3.01 2.15 -3.003 ***     1.43**
(3.56) (1.87) (2.68) (2.01) (.608) (.688)
Y_diff .0007 .0002 -.0011 -.001 -.0034 *** .0028***
(.0006) (.0006) (.009) (.0009) (.0004) (.0008)
Number  of observations 8480 8480 9657 9657 96650 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section III. Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait.
Heterosexual Cohabiting Couples
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Table 3. Estimation of the Labor Supply Regressions of Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples
Heads Partners Heads Partners Male  Female Husbands Wives
   (1) (2)    (3) (4)     (5) (6)     (7) (8)
Age_diff 4.61 ** -6.97 *** 4.67 *** -7.48 ** 3.57 *** -3.94 *** -3.003 *** 1.43 **
(2.30) (3.88) (2.74) (3.21) (.521) (.454) (.608) (.688)
Y_diff -.0037 ** .0095 * -.0065 * .0081 ** -.0042 *** .0053*** -.0034 *** .0028 ***
(.0018) (.0031) (.0022) (.0038) (.0006) (.0007) (.0004) (.0008)
Couple's non-labor income Y -.0086 *** -.0085 ** -.0052 *** -.0128 *** -.007 *** -.0076 *** -.0066 *** -.0087 ***
(.0015) (.0035) (.0018) (.0032) (.0004) (.0005) (.0004) (.0008)
Log of wage of head 175.20 *** 558.17 ** 270.83 *** 217.27 172.94 *** 194.39 *** 161.62 *** 179.49 ***
(57.05) (285.06) (61.08) (235.95) (40.29) (36.23) (30.99) (43.89)
Log of wage of partner 171.98 151.71 *** 310.98 104.62 *** 92.37 *** 590.57 ** 192.06 *** 137.83 ***
(73.09) ** (22.92) (423.69) (26.04) (17.26) (283.88) (38.08) (32.23)
Own Age  -1.81 -4.92 -6.09 ** -4.75 -6.20 *** 0.35 -7.49 *** -3.07
(2.31) (4.05) (2.49) (3.66) (.678) (.485) (.71) (.598)
Education of head 68.02 ** 176.70 * -91.83 ** -15.25 17.47 *** 4.22 10.5 *** -42.78 ***
(21.99) (105.56) (39.74) (31.71) (3.79) (6.16) (3.44) (7.29)
Education of partner 125.53 -6.27 10.67 * 14.02 -82.81 *** 38.28 -90.60 *** 46.87 **
(90.64) (12.10) (25.86) (14.63) (16.43) (26.94) (11.61) (20.64)
Number of children of head -45.40 *** -50.58 *** -17.53 -33.68 22.17 *** -83.86 *** 18.46 *** -110.00 ***
(15.43) (13.43) (41.07) (31.51) (4.83) (4.27) (2.09) (4.77)
Number of children of partner 71.42 * -16.54 32.46 *** -116.08 -22.73 *** -32.98 *** dropped because same as
(43.73) (48.47) (91.61) (139.93) (3.29) (4.54) number of head's children
Dummy for Black -117.43 *** -108.35 ** -173.89 *** -214.40 ** -144.73 *** 5.39 -246.65 *** 152.77 *
(47.43) (54.10) (66.84) (108.73) (8.91) (11.54) (11.66) (24.79)
Number  of observations 2950 2950 2588 2588 68762 68762 96650 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section III. Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait.
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Table 4.  Proportionality Tests on the Effects of Age and Non-Labor Income Differences on Lesbian, Gay and Heterosexual Couples
Estimated Ratio of Coefficients
Heads Partners Heads Partners Male  Female Husbands Wives
   (1) (2)    (3) (4)     (5) (6)     (7) (8)
coefficient of Y_diff -.0008 ** -.0013 * -.0014 * -.0011 * -.0011 *** -.0013 ***   '.0011 *** .0019*
coefficient of Age_diff (.0037) (.0008) (.0011) (.0006) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.001)
Test of equality of this ratio 
between heads and partners P = .34 P = .35 P = .489 P = .367
Number  of observations 2950 2950 2588 2588 68762 68762 96650 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated ratio of coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. 
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait. Heads and partners become male and female mates.
Lesbian Couples Cohabiting Couples
Heterosexual
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Table 5.  Sharing Rule for Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples 
Estimated Coefficients of the Head's share of a couple's non-labor income
Lesbian Couples Cohabiting Couples
Age_diff -383 -303 -272 173
Y_diff  .312 .420 .32 .196
Y .71 .34 .54 .38
log of wage of head  18358 11205 11760 12844
log of wage of partner -14301 -20174 -7041 -11096
Number  of observations 2950 2588 68762 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
The above coefficients represent the change in the head's share of the couple's non-labor income Y.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
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